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For some time past a ghost has 
been standing behind Alistair 
Darling sardonically monitoring 
his every action and thought with 
the expertise that comes from 
having lived through the United 
Kingdom’s last encounter with 
the dilemmas that are posed by 
the onset of a World Depression. 
And it is not John Maynard 
Keynes, who during the 1930s was 
little more than an observer and 
commentator. It is of course the 
Labour Party’s fi rst and probably 
most formidable Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, namely Philip Snowden.
In so many ways Darling is con-
fronting a re-run of 1929-1931 and 
has already had to recognise, like 
his distinguished predecessor, that 
mere Chancellors cannot prevent 
economic tsunamis infl icting great 
suffering on many humble people, 
whom both men undoubtedly came 
into politics to serve. But Snowden 
had an unusual clarity of mind that 
led him to rule out mere drift and 
to drop all pretence that the United 
Kingdom was so powerful and so 
infl uential that she did not need 
in the dire circumstances in which 
she found herself to court the good 
opinion of foreign governments, 
foreign investors and, above all, 
foreign bankers. For, though a life-
long progressive and socialist with 
roots in the West Riding’s Labour 
Churches, in the early ILP and in the 
anti-war movement, he had from 
the onset of the global economic 
crisis set his face against Lenin’s 
‘the worse the better’ approach. 
For example, to John Strachey, then 
a left-wing Labour MP known for 
his closeness to Sir Oswald (‘Tom’) 
Mosley, he addressed these words: 
2	 Policy	Report
I am very sorry to have to say that 
I cannot introduce into a Finance 
Bill proposals for the abolition of 
capitalism. I shall have to leave 
that for somebody else. I have 
often told my friends…that any 
attempt to abolish capitalism – I 
mean any catastrophic attempt 
– will bring far greater conditions 
of disaster to the people than those 
under which we are suffering.
Snowden was thus inexorably 
led in the emergency of 1929-1931 to 
try to prop up the prevailing order 
in the United Kingdom and that, 
he thought, meant retaining the 
confidence of important foreigners 
whose help might be and eventu-
ally was needed to prevent national 
bankruptcy. Above all, he attached 
importance to retaining international 
confidence in sterling, which he saw 
was vital to a country that needed 
to be able to import food and raw 
materials. To prevent a ruinous run 
on the pound he was accordingly 
willing in a deepening recession to 
cut various items of public expendi-
ture; to raise the standard rate of 
taxation; and to acquiesce in increases 
in bank rate (which eventually 
peaked at six per cent!). And in all 
this the hyper-inflationary German 
experience of the early 1920s was 
never far from his thoughts. Moreo-
ver, his passionate commitment to 
protecting the interests of the weaker 
members of society is plain from the 
words he addressed to the House 
of Commons on 11 February 1931:
I say with all the seriousness I can 
command that the national position is 
so grave that drastic and disagreeable 
measures will have to be taken. 
Expenditure which may be easy 
and tolerable in prosperous times 
becomes intolerable in a state of grave 
industrial depression…. Schemes 
involving heavy expenditure, 
however desirable they may be, 
will have to wait until prosperity 
returns. This is necessary – I say 
this particularly to my Honourable 
Friends behind – to uphold the 
present standard of living, and 
no class will ultimately benefit 
more by present economy than the 
wage-earners. I have been in active 
political life for forty years, and my 
only object has been to improve the 
lot of the toiling millions. That is 
still my aim and object, and, if I ask 
for some temporary suspensions, 
some temporary sacrifice, it is 
because that is necessary to make 
future progress possible.
 As is well known, matters came 
to a head in August 1931 when the 
Labour Cabinet split on the relatively 
narrow question about whether 
or not to cut unemployment ben-
efit in pursuit of across-the-board 
measures designed to show foreign 
holders of sterling that the United 
Kingdom could balance its budget. 
It was Ramsay MacDonald who 
led some Labour ministers into a 
coalition administration that sub-
sequently won a landslide victory 
in a general election two months 
later. But it was Snowden, not Mac-
Donald, who was the inspiration 
behind the crusade to save sterling.
Ironically, even the coalition’s 
success in passing an emergency 
budget involving unemployment 
benefit cuts proved insufficient 
to stop the currency run despite 
the belated provision of generous 
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international loans; and Snowden 
himself, still Chancellor, then had 
to abandon the gold standard and 
accept in effect a twenty per cent 
devaluation against the dollar. But 
thereafter the pound stabilised. 
Beatrice Webb famously said that 
nobody had told the Labour Cabinet 
they could do this. But the truth 
is surely that they could not have 
done so. For without accompanying 
financial rectitude the devaluation 
would not have worked. Instead, one 
currency crisis would have followed 
another, as happened during the 
late 1930s to France, which had to 
devalue on three separate occasions.
So what would the ghost of Snow-
den make of Darling’s handling of 
a not dissimilar British crisis? He 
would of course be aware that since 
at least 1945 he has been widely 
condemned by all right-thinking 
followers of Keynes for saying (and 
believing) that ‘a nation, like an 
individual, cannot go on increasing 
expenditure when income is falling, 
unless it wants to be landed in bank-
ruptcy’. And he would know that 
failings by him and by fellow ‘defla-
tionists’ in the United States and in 
Germany are said to have ‘proved’ 
that the way to tackle today’s prob-
lems is to run deficits, to spend our 
way out of recession, to ‘save’ all 
financial institutions in trouble, to cut 
interest rates to ever lower levels, to 
largely disregard inflationary risks 
and to assume that currency rela-
tivities matter little. But Snowden’s 
ghost, if I understand him, is not 
persuaded that he was so far wrong 
in the Great Depression even if he 
was at times somewhat over-zealous 
and especially so in his handling 
of less gifted colleagues. And he is 
expecting soon to be largely vindi-
cated by British events, even if not 
in the near future by developments 
in the Eurozone and the United 
States. For he cannot believe that a 
country with the limited ‘clout’ of 
the United Kingdom (now markedly 
less even than in 1931) can success-
fully disregard the fate of the pound 
or posture as if it is a Great Power 
(or a pivotal power, as Tony Blair 
revealingly described it) fully quali-
fied patronisingly to lecture others 
and can behave in economic mat-
ters with at least as much bravado 
as the essentially inexperienced 
and unsophisticated Uncle Sam. 
Snowden’s ghost has been much 
struck by the fact that the United 
Kingdom now has only one per 
cent of global population, though it 
seems blissfully unaware of it. What 
a contrast with his own era when 
one third of the map of the world 
was coloured red! And he is also 
bemused by evidence on all sides 
that the United Kingdom has appar-
ently set its face for the foreseeable 
‘Even the coalition’s success in 
passing an emergency budget 
involving unemployment 
benefit cuts proved insufficient 
to stop the currency run’
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future against abandoning sterling 
in favour of the heavyweight euro 
that was not even in contemplation 
in his lifetime. Moreover, Snowden’s 
ghost knows that sterling has already 
fallen by more than 20 per cent from 
recent peaks against both the dol-
lar and the euro; and so he cannot 
understand why Darling (and his 
highly irresponsible predecessor 
who left the national cupboard bare) 
should have seen fit to pressurise 
the Bank of England into slashing 
bank rate below its counterpart in 
the Eurozone and ever closer to 
that of the United States itself. 
Do they not see, asks Snowden’s 
ghost, that foreign investors will 
soon be asking why they should 
keep money in a country that has 
variously been characterised as a 
mega-Hungary and the world’s 
largest hedge fund. And he wonders 
how long it will be before bank rate 
has to be raised again in a prob-
ably vain attempt to stave off a 
further visit from the IMF, which, 
for all its own impoverishment, 
still appears to stand for the kind 
of rectitude he himself deployed 
in order to save a large propor-
tion of the British people from the 
Hungry Thirties of popular myth?
My expectation is that Darling’s 
United Kingdom will indeed come an 
early cropper. But I fear that Snow-
den’s ghost will not get any credit for 
prescience. For all right-thinking Brit-
ons already have a fallback position 
ready. If another IMF-style crucifixion 
materialises the blame will not be 
attributed to Darling. Instead, it will 
fall on the hapless Monetary Policy 
Committee for not cutting bank rate 
much sooner and much deeper! 
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